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tering in,' I stated explicitly, on the same page, that 'conscious processes develop their own suggestions.' I am also credited with deriving suggestions 'from' the 'complication of sense-data,' although I took pains to say that 'the mechanism of suggestion lies outside the limits of our inquiry,' and in the summary, from which Mr. Johnston quotes, where I say '*with* the complication of sense-data, etc.' (p. 206), only a temporal relation is stated. With these corrections I still fail to see how it is possible to accurately report the earliest stages of the experiences under consideration as contents of consciousness.

In conclusion I wish to express my appreciation of Mr. Johnston's services in calling special attention to a paper which, while it deals with quite a limited field of inquiry, has in it, for me at any rate, the points of starting of many others, and I can very well understand that if it has not 'established' anything—the fates forbid we should be so near intellectual bankruptcy as that—it may serve a higher purpose in being the center, for a few minds, of an intellectual ferment.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum and a History of Classifications of the Sciences. ROBERT FLINT. Edinburgh and London, Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1904. Pp. x + 340.

Professor Flint is known widely as the author of two works on the philosophy of history and of several theological treatises distinctly controversial in character. The merits and defects of the work before us suggest these two lines of the author's activity. On the one hand, it denotes exhaustive research, it contains within small compass an astonishing amount of material, thoroughly reliable as to matters of fact, set forth in perfect order and with a conciseness commendable as rare in philosophical works. But, on the other hand, though dialectical skill is not infrequently exhibited, it is shown rather in keenness of distinction than in search for and criticism of basal presuppositions.

The value of the book, therefore, is largely historical; it is a work of reference, and offers perhaps little of importance in the way of logical or metaphysical discussion. But its appearance at this time has a significance of which the author is well aware, though he is none too explicit in the matter. It marks a new direction in the study and teaching of philosophy.

Comte and Spencer were at one in their desire to turn men of philosophic bent from certain studies that still are held to be the 'main problems of philosophy,' such as the nature of mind, its relation to the body, idealism and realism, knowledge and faith, and how we know we know. It is not too much to say that the normal British and American mind is heartily sick of certain of these problems as discussed. But neither Comte nor Spencer effected his purpose. If such problems are now to move from the center of the stage, they are not relegated to the lumber room of philosophical history on the ground of senselessness or insolubility; they will have a place merely coordinate with other problems, and primarily because of a restatement involving at least their partial solution. To say this, I take it, is the real significance of the first part of Professor Flint's book. Philosophy is not merely *scientia scientiarum,* he says; but, as such, it has a splendid and indispensable duty. And the second part of the book shows, as has never been shown before, the richness of material, the accumulated stores on which he who would fulfil this duty may work. 'Philosophy, thus viewed, would afford the most important guidance in education. It must be, indeed, the very basis of rational education in science.' A philosophy of science 'would lay the very corner-stone of the science of education' (pp. 21, 22). This conception, though not new to theory, is alien to practice. But it is emphatically the thing for which British philosophy has stood and which British and American philosophy may soon in a measure effect. And I suppose that this book should be viewed almost as a text-book for the study and teaching of philosophy as the science of the principles of science.

The first sixty pages deal with the divisions of philosophy. We must note here an inconsistency. On page 5 Flint says, 'philosophy, viewed as *scientia scientiarum,* is simply science which has attained to a knowledge of the unity, self consistency, and harmony of the teachings of the separate sciences.' But this task he makes later (pp. 29, 37) but one of three problems with which philosophy as *scientia scientiarum* is concerned; it is the problem, viz., of *positive* philosophy; and there remain the problems of *critical* philosophy, the 'investigation into the nature of knowledge itself'; and the problem of metaphysical philosophy, 'a theory of being and becoming.' These three constitute theoretical philosophy, or *scientia scientiarum.* Philosophy also includes the problem of *practical* philosophy, dealing with the worth of things 'in relation to one another, and to the great final end of existence' (p. 37).

Positive is a term nicely fitted and historically limited to the Comtist philosophy, and it is a misnomer for a philosophy that counts itself but a division of philosophy. It were better to identify this first division of theoretical philosophy with *scientia scientiarum;* particularly if we believe, as I think we must, that the distinctions drawn between it and critical and 'metaphysical' philosophy melt before examination. The latent purpose of the author, I take it, is to clear the philosophical field for a philosophy of science (theoretical philosophy), on the one hand, and a philosophy of history (practical philosophy), on the other.

In the two hundred and seventy-three pages of large print that follow on the history of classifications of the sciences every important classification yet made is offered, with explanations and brief criticisms. This is the first task for philosophy as *scientia scientiarum* and as positive philosophy (p. 67). The arrangement is simply chronological. It is characteristic of the author that, while he finds something to condemn and to commend in each system, he goes almost to an extreme in avoiding any such comparison and synthesis of the several schemes as might possibly lead to a warping of his presentation of their principles and details. Seldom does he defend his criticisms; space no doubt forbids. We are told that Kant or Hegel *err,* and there is an end.

It seems at first sight a real defect that no classification of these classifications is appended, nor any positive system advanced as right, in opposition to the systems every one of which is declared, in some important feature, to be wrong. But the educational purpose of the author is only thereby made apparent. He is preparing a field for future culture, rather than gathering last season's crops.

Besides the better known classifications are included several Italian systems, and the neglected work of Ampère. Most space is given, naturally, to the systems of Plato (which, with that of Bain, he comes nearest to approving), Aristotle, Bacon, Hobbes, Hegel, Comte, Spencer and Pearson. In every case the student is put in the way of referring to the original statement of the system. Least satisfactory is the account of Hegel's system. Dr. Flint is content to leave the reader with the impression that Hegel gained his system not from study of the world, but from 'the bosom of a metaphysical philosophy.' Yet he affirms that 'to ignore the truth and grandeur of his general theory of the correlation and combination of the sciences, in critically gazing at such imperfections, must be pronounced almost as irrational as to doubt or deny the brightness of the sun, because a telescopic examination shows it to be mottled over with a number of dark spots.' Among the few cases where Dr. Flint must be accused of ignoring the real meaning of the writer is his criticism of Hobbes's description of ethics as conversant with men's passions, and of the 'science of just and unjust' as dealing with 'consequences from speech in contracting.' The most cursory examination of Hobbes's position should reveal that by ethics he here means a branch of psychology (and etymology might defend the use); while by the science of the just and unjust is meant something like the study of the formal side of the laws that be, divorced from that study of the grounds and principles of right and law that Hobbes terms politics. That is, instead of dealing in a 'strange and arbitrary way' with 'moral science,' it is obvious that he is not, as concerns these two sciences, dealing with moral science at all.

The criticism Dr. Flint makes on Aristotle's conception of philosophy raises a particularly interesting point. We may pass over his contention that 'the distinction between productive and practical sciences ought not to have the importance' Aristotle assigns it, since 'every science is both regulative of action and productive of results.' The second contention that sciences should not be classified according to their ends, since these lie beyond the sciences to which they belong, and are nothing fixed, need not detain us; though both points are eminently fertile. The third 'defect' noted is 'the want of a philosophy inclusive of, but superior to the sciences.' Aristotle 'viewed philosophy as merely a whole, a sum made up of the sciences as a unit is made up of its component fractions. But this leaves no philosophy distinct from the sciences, and either able or entitled to coordinate and organize them.' "What Aristotle called First Philosophy and his commentators Metaphysics, does not perform this function. Its object is being as being, and so it is the antecedent and presupposition of all other sciences, . . . but it possesses a merely abstract universality, and it has no power, nor is it any part of its business to organize the various sciences into a system."

Certain features of this argument seem to me particularly unfortunate. What can be clearer than that such a science as Professor Flint desires, that should embrace all other sciences, and yet somehow be superior to them, must be preeminently abstract. On the contrary, what is more obviously concrete than Aristotle's metaphysical conclusion? The notion, too, of a science apart from, yet governing all sciences seems to require yet another science that shall govern that other superior science, or at least point out its relation to the remaining sciences. If it is denied that this science of sciences is strictly apart from the other subordinate sciences, one must answer that it is then either the whole of such sciences or one of them. That it is not the whole of the sciences Dr. Flint explicitly urges. That it is one of them is the Aristotelian contention. It is the *first* of them. To the whole he gives the name *philosophia* or *sophia*. That they constitute an organic whole is rather assumed than proven by Aristotle. It is the assumption of Platonic dialectic, and is implied, apparently, in Aristotle's treatment. The demonstration, it is true, he did not complete. He approached it from two paths, I think: in his classification of the sciences, and in his doctrine of the categories. The latter point brings us to a further objection to Dr. Flint's criticism. He says that Aristotle had no place for Logic in his scheme of sciences, that he excluded it from them. Again, however, it is stated that Aristotle regarded it specifically as an introduction to metaphysics or first philosophy (p. 80). But surely the relation was much closer than this. It would be difficult to name one chapter of the metaphysics that is not a chapter in logic, or of the analytics or the categories that is not metaphysical. And in the doctrine of the categories, in the suggestions that are made as to the relations of the several categories, as well as in the fundamental propositions laid down as to the great categories of form and matter, power and exercise, motion, end and cause or principle, here we seem to have the beginning of the proof of what is from the start assumed, that philosophy or knowledge as a whole is a system, a whole that is organic, at least in some sense of that misused term.

If a fault is to be found with the general plan of the history of the classification of the sciences, perhaps it lies in the neglect of such works as Hume's chapter on 'Knowledge' in the Treatise, Kant's 'Transcendental Analytik' and Hegel's 'Logic.' All classifications of the sciences presuppose certain assumptions as to the relations of the categories, similar in general character to those there formulated. And inquiries along those lines must be made before the classification of the sciences can hope to get beyond the empirical stage in which, as Karl Pearson so clearly recognizes, it at present lies.

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The Content and Validity of the Causal Law. BENNO ERDMANN. *Philosophical Review,* March and May, 1905. Pp. 136–165, 290–307.

Professor Erdmann's article on the 'Content and Validity of Causal Law' in the March and May numbers of the *Philosophical Review* is an attempt to find a basis for the methodology of the sciences of fact, through an examination of the notion of causality. Modern discussions of course presuppose the synthetic character of the causal relation, as opposed to the rational analytic conception of the older 'concept' philosophy. A start then may be taken from the tradition that the uniformity of the sequence of events is a necessary presupposition of the relation between cause and effect, a uniformity given as an element of our experience. But in this there is much more involved than the sensory contents of experience. Uniformity of sequence lies not in the immediately given, but arises through the fact that in the course of repeated perceptions we apprehend through abstraction the uniformities of their temporal relation. It involves, namely, reproductive elements, and that too of uniformities of qualitative content as well as of sequence. Again, there is involved in revival the further element of recognition—an awareness of the essential identity of the present revived content with that of the previous perceptions. Finally, to relate the contents of two ideas means a process in which attention is directed to the elements of the mental content, and which leads us to identify them with one another or differentiate one from another; and this is an act of thinking, not a sensation.

But while uniformity is a *necessary* presupposition, is it also an *adequate* one? Strict empiricism must, of course, discard entirely the added terms 'invariable' and 'unconditional' which even Mill recognizes as essential. Causality can only have a problematic validity. Further, both scientific and popular thought has always regarded the relation as one, not of mere sequence, but of dynamic dependence. For this also no place is left, in terms either of will or of force. The legitimate outcome is to give up the word cause altogether, as representing nothing whatever distinctive. If, therefore, we are not to deny the causal relationship instead of explaining it, it follows that there must be contained in it, besides the elements of reproductive recognition and those of identification and discrimination, which are involved in the abstract comprehension of uniform sequence, an additional element of thought. The writer's thesis is this: Wherever two events *a* and *b* are known to follow one an-